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Abstract
We study urban, private sector Chinese employers’ preferences between workers with
and without a local permanent residence permit (hukou) using callback information
from an Internet job board. We find that these employers prefer migrant workers to
locals who are identically matched to the job’s requirements; these preferences are
strongest in jobs requiring lower levels of education and offering low pay. While
migrant-native payroll tax differentials might account for some of this gap, we argue
that the patterns are hard to explain without some role for a migrant productivity
advantage in less skilled jobs. Possible sources of this advantage include positive
selection of nonlocals into migration, negative selection of local workers into formal
search for unskilled private sector jobs, efficiency wage effects related to unskilled
migrants’ limited access to the urban social safety net, and intertemporal labor and
effort substitution by temporary migrants that makes them more desirable workers.
Jel codes: O15, R23
Keywords: Temporary migration, China, Hukou
1 Introduction
A common claim in popular discussions of migration is that employers prefer to hire
workers with limited residency rights—such as temporary or undocumented
migrants—over equally qualified natives, because these migrant workers are willing to work
harder, for longer hours, or for less pay. Such claims coexist with others arguing that em-
ployers discriminate against migrants, either for taste-based reasons or out of a desire to
protect native workers.1 Yet despite substantial literatures on the labor market outcomes of
temporary and undocumented migrants (e.g., Dustmann 2000, Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark
2002, Kahanec and Shields 2013), it appears that no study has examined employers’ hiring
choices between workers with different residency rights in any jurisdiction.2
This paper studies employers’ choices between workers with and without permanent
residency rights in a context that has been called the largest migration in human history
(Chan, 2013). In 2010, the internal rural migrant population in China’s cities was esti-
mated at 206 million persons, or about two thirds of the entire U.S. population (Chan
2012, Table 1). A noteworthy feature of this migration is that unlike the U.S., and unlike
many other developing nations, Chinese people do not have the right to permanently
reside in any part of the country. Instead, each person is born with a city or province of
permanent registration (hukou). While this does not prevent people from migrating to
other jurisdictions for temporary work, it places severe limits on their ability to settle
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Table 1 Sample means by applicant’s Hukou status, XMRC data
Local Hukou Non-Local Hukou
a. Contacted by HR department 0.072 0.086
b. Characteristics of the applicant:
Education (years) 14.38 14.35
Age (years) 25.94 24.56
Experience (years) 4.11 3.16
New graduate? 0.129 0.188
Female 0.592 0.539
Current wage listed? 0.691 0.695
Current wage, if listed (yuan/month) 2303 2258
Married 0.316 0.159
Occupational qualification (Zhicheng) 1.128 1.199
Myopic 0.334 0.297
Height (cm) 165.5 165.6
English CV available? 0.128 0.126
Number of schools listed in the CV 0.831 0.775
Number of experience spells described in the CV 2.715 2.420
Number of certifications 1.380 1.171
c. Characteristics of the job ad:
Education requested (years) 13.02 12.89
Desired age range specified? 0.552 0.541
Desired age, if requested (midpoint of interval) 27.47 27.09
Experience requested 1.033 0.944
New graduate requested? 0.047 0.043
Male applicants requested? 0.129 0.135
Female applicants requested? 0.328 0.298
Wage advertised? 0.570 0.589
Wage, if advertised (yuan/month, midpoint of interval) 2316 2366
Number of positions advertised 1.883 2.121
Number of applicants 181.3 190.2
d. Characteristics of the firm placing the Ad:
Domestically owned 0.732 0.759
Taiwan, Hong Kong ownership 0.100 0.089
Foreign owned 0.168 0.152
Xiamen firm location 0.968 0.970
Fujian firm location 0.026 0.025
Other firm location (within China) 0.005 0.004
Number of employees 655 563
e. Sample size 17896 203239
LH-NLH gaps in applicant education, current wage listed, height, English CV, male requested, Xiamen firm location,
and Fujian firm location are not statistically significant. New graduate requested, zhicheng level, applicant wage, and
domestic firm location differ at 5% and all remaining variables at 1%. Zhicheng level is an integer ranging from 1 to 6.
Xiamen is located within Fujian province. LH in Table 1 and throughout our main analysis denotes Xiamen city hukou
only; workers with Fujian province (but not Xiamen) hukou are treated as NLH because their legal status in the city is the
same as workers from other provinces
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permanently in any location other than the one corresponding to their birth hukou. Since
a worker’s hukou status is relatively public information, China’s internal migration system
provides a unique laboratory in which to study employers’ preferences between workers
with different residency rights.
To that end, this paper uses internal data from XMRC, an Internet job board in Xiamen,
a medium-sized, prosperous Chinese city, to pose the following question: among equally
qualified local hukou (LH, or ‘native’) and non-local hukou (NLH, or ‘migrant’) candidates
who have applied for the same job, which applicants are more likely to receive an employer
contact? Our main finding is that employers on this job board, which caters to private-
sector firms seeking relatively skilled workers, prefer workers without a permanent resi-
dence permit over equally-matched permanent residents; specifically, there is a difference
in callback rates to the same job of about 0.8 percentage points, or 11 percent. This gap is
considerably larger in jobs requiring lower levels of education and in jobs offering lower
wages. While migrant-native payroll tax differentials might account for some of this gap,
we argue that the observed patterns are hard to explain without some role for a migrant
productivity advantage over natives, especially in less skilled jobs. Higher levels of migrant
productivity could stem from a number of sources, including positive selection of nonlo-
cals into migration, negative selection of local workers into search for the unskilled private
sector jobs that disproportionately employ migrants, efficiency wage effects related to un-
skilled migrants’ limited access to the urban social safety net, and intertemporal labor and
effort substitution by temporary migrants that makes them more desirable workers.
In addition to these substantive results, our paper makes three methodological contribu-
tions. One is to illustrate the potential of large samples of naturally occurring applications
on Internet job boards to study the value of employee characteristics and credentials. Com-
pared to resume audit studies (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004, Oreopoulos 2011, Kroft et
al. 2013), job board data let us study large samples of applications and callbacks at a very
low marginal cost.3 These large samples allow researchers to generate estimates for a more
representative set of jobs and to explore match effects between worker and job attributes
in a way that is not practical when one is creating and experimentally manipulating re-
sumes. Naturally occurring job board data also avoids the use of fictitious resumes, which
can raise issues of credibility in resume audit studies.
Job board data also reveal differences in application behavior between groups, allowing
us to estimate the effects of how workers direct their search on their callback rates. For ex-
ample, we show that migrants’ 11 percent callback advantage relative to equally qualified
local applicants to the same job (our analog to the quantity estimated by the resume audit
approach) substantially understates their advantage when still controlling for qualifica-
tions, but when not conditioning on where they apply. This is because migrants, on aver-
age, apply to jobs that are ‘easier to get’ and that pay lower wages relative to their
qualifications. More generally, whether workers’ application choices accentuate or miti-
gate the callback gaps they face within ads has implications for the labor market effects of
employers’ callback choices, and cannot be studied with standard resume audit methods.
A drawback of naturally-occurring job board data, of course, is the fact that the re-
sume characteristics we study are not randomly assigned. Thus, if employers base call-
back decisions on worker characteristics they observe but we cannot hold constant,
job-board-based estimates of the ‘pure’ effects of any given resume characteristic may
be biased. That said, if we evaluate our approach with respect to the same criterion as
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resume audit studies—specifically, if the goal is to measure how employers react to
specific features of a resume—the scope for omitted variable bias with naturally
occurring resumes is relatively limited. This is because callback decisions on a job
board (as opposed to hiring or pay decisions) are typically made only on the basis of in-
formation contained in a worker’s resume. Thus, the only information about applicants
that is observed by employers but not controlled for in our regressions are the features
of the worker’s online resume that we have not fully been able to code into our vector
of control variables. While such aspects (such as formatting, grammar, unusual types of
experience, etc.) certainly do exist, they are probably less important than between-
group differences in employers’ expectations of workers’ interview and job perform-
ance, which are not eliminated by randomizing group membership on resumes.4
A second methodological contribution is to illustrate the importance of the sample of
jobs that is used in empirical studies of groups’ relative success in the recruitment process.
In particular, job sampling plays a critical role whenever employers (or even jobs)
specialize in hiring different types of workers; imagine, for example, a situation where one
group of workers has preferential access to ‘good’ (e.g., high wage) jobs, while firms offer-
ing ‘bad’ jobs prefer to hire the other worker type.5 In such a world, there might be no dif-
ference between two groups in their mean chances of getting a job offer, but both the size
and sign of the offer or callback gap can depend on the type of job being applied to. Thus,
if the sample of jobs surveyed is disproportionately ‘good’ (as it tends to be in existing
audit studies) the results will overstate the favored group’s advantage in securing an offer
at a randomly selected job. On the other hand, if the sample of jobs is disproportionately
‘bad,’ we might see that the group with worse labor market outcomes overall is preferred
by employers. This is arguably what we observe in our data, and it does not necessarily in-
dicate reverse discrimination, or even an absence of discrimination in this labor market.
In sum, estimated callback differentials are only relevant to the sample of jobs studied.
While this caveat applies both to resume audit studies and to job board studies like ours,
it is arguably more important in the former case because of the more restricted sample of
jobs for which credible, fictitious resumes can practically be designed.
Third, while it is common to hear claims that employers prefer to hire (say) migrant
(or female) workers “because they are cheaper,” to our knowledge no existing studies of
the hiring process consider the possible effects on callbacks of expected wage differences
between workers who are hired in response to the same job ad. Clearly, if employers
expect to be able to pay migrants (or women, or minorities) less, this could affect em-
ployers’ callback and hiring choices between two equally qualified applicants in a way
that has been hard to assess in existing work. In this paper we take two approaches to
bounding the effects of this form of (expected) wage discrimination. One is to distin-
guish between job ads with and without posted wages (since wage discrimination
between worker types is arguably more difficult in posted-wage jobs). The other takes
advantage of information on the current wages reported by job applicants on their
resumes, which should place some bounds on the wages employers will have to pay to
hire these workers. In our case, neither method suggests that within-job wage discri-
mination against migrants can account for their callback advantage. More generally,
resume-based data on current wages help to bound the effects of expected within-job
wage discrimination on callback rates: a factor that has been largely ignored in the existing
literature.
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Section 2 provides some background on China’s hukou system, both nationally and as
it applies to our study city. Section 3 describes our data and methods, while Section 4
presents the main results. Section 5 discusses possible explanations of employers’ NLH
preferences, while Section 6 concludes.
2 What is Hukou?
Hukou is the legal right to permanently reside in a Chinese province or city.6 It is
inherited from a parent (historically the mother) regardless of where one is born and is
very hard to change. For example, neither long periods of residence in a new location nor
marriage to a person of different hukou are sufficient to change one’s hukou. While Chinese
workers are de facto relatively free to take jobs in areas where they do not have a permanent
residence permit, both state and city governments have created a set of rules that distin-
guish between local hukou (LH) and non-local hukou persons (NLH) in a number of key
markets, including those for housing, labor, education and health. Each province and city
government also sets the rules for how migrants can acquire a local hukou.
One main set of legal differences between LH and NLH persons in most Chinese
jurisdictions is in eligibility for government-provided benefits and services, especially edu-
cation and social insurance. For example in our study city, Xiamen, neither LH nor NLH
children pay elementary or junior middle school tuition, but LH children have priority in
admissions. Seats not filled by LH children are assigned by lottery among NLH children
(Xiamen Education Bureau 2010), raising significant barriers for NLH children. Some
other cities impose tuition fees on NLH children; together these restrictions lead many
NLH workers to leave their children in the care of relatives in their home region, creating
a generation of ‘left-behind’ children (Démurger and Xu, 2013).
China’s social insurance programs, which are designed and administered by provincial
and city governments, typically provide much lower benefits to NLH workers, but also im-
pose lower payroll taxes on them. In Xiamen during our study period, LH and NLH
workers were treated identically in the unemployment insurance, worker’s compensation,
and childbirth benefits programs, but the two most important social insurance
programs—retirement and medical insurance—stipulated lower benefit and tax levels for
NLH than for LH workers. At the mean wage in our analysis sample (about 2300 yuan
per month), the average payroll tax rate for these two programs together was .31 for locals
and .09 for migrants, of which .21 and .05 was paid by employers (and the remaining .10
and .04 by workers). We present additional details on the structure of this tax differential
in Section 5, since it could certainly affect employers’ choices between equally qualified
LH and NLH applicants.
The second main set of legal distinctions between NLH and LH persons is a patchwork
of rules limiting migrants’ access to labor, real estate and some other markets. For ex-
ample, before and during our analysis period, NLH persons could purchase a maximum
of one apartment in Xiamen (General Office of Xiamen People's Government 2013).7 In
Beijing, NLH workers face barriers in entering the lottery for a car license plate (Beijing
Municipal Transportation Committee et al. 2013). A variety of formal and informal re-
strictions can also affect the types of jobs NLH workers are allowed to take. While variable
across cities and often hard to document officially, a number of sources report explicit re-
strictions on hiring NLH persons as taxi drivers, hotel front desk personnel, lawyers, and
in Kentucky Fried Chicken stores in Beijing.8 Some state-owned enterprises, as well as
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provincial and city governments, are claimed to favor LH workers and occasionally will
even announce explicit LH quotas.9 While we have no hard evidence of such restrictions
in Xiamen, employment patterns (described below) suggest that LH preferences may exist
for government and SOE jobs there as well.
To provide some context for our analysis, the LH and NLH populations of China’s
major cities are described in Appendix 1, which is calculated from 2005 Census micro-
data.10 Statistics specific to Xiamen are also shown. Overall, Appendix 1 documents
four key facts that are common to Xiamen and other major Chinese cities. First, NLH
persons form a majority of the working population: in Xiamen they constitute 61 per-
cent of the employed population and 70 percent of the private sector workers; in all
Tier 1 and 2 cities as a group, these numbers are 57 and 73 percent.11 Second, the
urban NLH population is much younger and much less educated than working-age na-
tives; for example, 60 percent of Xiamen’s NLH working age residents are age 35 or
younger, compared to 39 percent of natives. Sixty-six percent of NLH have at most a
junior middle school education (9 years) compared to 46 percent of natives.
Third, urban NLH residents are much more attached to the labor market and work
much longer hours than natives. Employment rates (in the working-age population) are 83
percent for working-age migrants compared to 68 percent for natives; one in three
employed migrants in Xiamen put in more than 56 hours per week compared to just 12
percent of employed natives. Finally, consistent with the notion that NLH workers face bar-
riers to public sector employment, only 22 percent of employed migrants in China’s major
cities work in the broader public sector (government plus State-Owned Enterprises
(SOEs)), compared to 62 percent of employed urban natives. As we shall argue, this ten-
dency for urban natives to cluster in public sector jobs—which is more muted but still very
substantial in Xiamen—provides an important context for our results in this paper, which
apply to private sector employers only.
3 Data and methods
3.1 Source and sample construction
With a 2010 Census population of 3.5 million, the city of Xiamen forms the center of a
prosperous metropolitan area of 16.8 million people on China’s southern coast. While con-
siderably smaller in population than Beijing and Shanghai, Xiamen’s income levels are rela-
tively close to those cities’, with 2010 GDP per capita at 58,337 yuan, compared to 75,943
and 76,074 yuan for Beijing and Shanghai, respectively. In other respects, Appendix 1 shows
that Xiamen is roughly representative of major cities in China; a very similar share of the
local population (27-28%) is college-educated, though Xiamen’s population is somewhat
younger and the public sector is considerably less important as an employer.
XMRC (http://www.xmrc.com.cn), the job board that is the source of our data, is a for-
profit company sponsored by the Xiamen Personnel Bureau (a branch of the local govern-
ment devoted to the market for skilled labor). Since it was established in 2000, XMRC’s
mandate has been to be the main labor market intermediary serving skilled, private-sector
workers in the Xiamen metropolitan area.12 XMRC operates like a typical U.S. job board,
with both job ads and resumes posted online. Workers and firms can contact each other to
submit applications, arrange interviews, etc., through the site. According to our conversa-
tions with job board executives in other cities, XMRC is nationally recognized for its
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dominance in Xiamen; national competitors did not attempt to establish a presence there
until very recently and have not had much success. In part, XMRC’s dominance in Xiamen’s
skilled labor market stems from its stable clientele of local employers, who value good rela-
tions with XMRC managers, many of whom are also local government officers. XMRC’s
dominance is also facilitated by its physical location within government offices providing
employment and social-security related services to employers.
Our analysis sample is extracted from XMRC’s internal database and is designed to repre-
sent the inflow of new job ads during a window of time plus all the applications that were
ever made to those ads.13 Specifically, we asked XMRC to provide us with all the ads for
jobs in Xiamen that received their first application between May 1 and October 30, 2010.
Then we asked XMRC to provide us with all the resumes that applied to those ads, plus in-
formation on all the firms that posted those ads. We also have a mapping of which resumes
applied to which ads and a record of which resumes were subsequently contacted by each
firm through the XMRC website. Receiving such a contact is our indicator of worker suc-
cess in the hiring process.14 To ensure that we capture all contacts resulting from applica-
tions made during our sampling window, we continued to monitor all the ads posted
during that window until January 13, 2011 (74 days after Oct. 30 2010). Most contacts occur
very quickly, however (within 2 weeks of application). Finally, since our interest is in which
workers are selected by firms for interviews or employment, the sample of ads used in this
paper excludes ads that never resulted in any employer contacts via the XMRC site.15
Other criteria used in constructing our analysis sample include dropping ads with a
minimum requested age below 18 or a maximum requested age over 60; ads offering
more than 10,000 yuan/month; ads requesting a master’s, professional or PhD degree (all
of these were rare); ads for more than 10 vacancies, ads for jobs located outside the city of
Xiamen, and ads with missing firm information. We also dropped resumes listing a
current wage above 10,000 yuan/month, with missing hukou information or with non-
Chinese citizenship, as well as applications that couldn’t be matched to both an ad and a
resume. Finally, we dropped a small number of ads for jobs in State-Owned Enterprises
and not-for-profit organizations. Despite being a substantial share of employment
in Xiamen, ads for SOE jobs are very rare on XMRC, as most recruiting for these positions
goes through other channels. Thus our results refer to hiring for private-sector jobs only.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Our data consist of 221,135 applications made by 78,031 workers (resumes) to 3,489 ads
placed by 1,551 firms, resulting in 18,731 callbacks. Thus, a typical ad received about 63 ap-
plications, of which 5.4 were contacted by the employer. Means in this sample are presented
in Table 1, separately for applications from workers with local and non-local hukou.16
As a comparison of Table 1 and Appendix 1 makes clear, applications in our XMRC sam-
ple are not representative of Xiamen’s employed population.17 Specifically, our sample has a
much larger share of young, highly educated, and migrant workers than Xiamen’s 2005
workforce. The much higher levels of education in our sample are consistent with XMRC’s
mandate to serve skilled workers, with the massive expansion of higher education in China
between 2005 and 2010 (Shen and Kuhn 2013), and with the fact that educated jobseekers
are more likely to look for work online than less-educated jobseekers (Kuhn and Mansour,
2014). The high share of young and migrant workers is consistent with the fact that our
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XMRC data is a sample of job applications, not of employed persons; not only do young
workers tend to change jobs more frequently than older workers (Topel and Ward 1992),
our data contain a significant share of new labor market entrants. The very high share of
migrant applications in our data—91.9 percent (203,239/221,135) compared to migrants’ 70
percent share of Xiamen’s 2005 employed private sector workers—is consistent with a sce-
nario in which migrants search for new jobs on arrival in Xiamen and one where prospect-
ive migrants look for work on XMRC while still living elsewhere.18
In addition to applicants’ age, education and hukou, our data also include measures of
their experience (total years and number of spells), sex, current wage, marital status, height,
an indicator for myopia, the number of schools attended, whether an English version of the
resume was available, and number of certifications listed. For each application, we also have
data on the requirements listed by employers in the job ad, including the desired education,
experience, age and gender.19 The typical job ad requested about 13 years of education,
around a year less than the average education level of the applicants. Over half the job ads
stipulated a desired age, with a mean of 27 (about 2.4 years older than the typical applicant).
About 59 percent of job ads posted a wage, and the mean posted wage (2,362 yuan/month)
is about 4.4 percent higher than the mean current wage listed by workers (2,261) in their re-
sumes. Our data also have an indicator for the number of positions that were available
(about 2 on average), and we can measure the number of applications each application is
competing with.20 Finally, we have indicators of firm ownership, head office location, and
size (number of employees) as well as firm identifiers.
While most of the differences between LH and NLH workers and the jobs they are apply-
ing to in Table 1 are statistically significant due to the large sample sizes, most of the differ-
ences are quantitatively small and in the expected direction for migrant versus non-migrant
populations. Specifically, NLH and LH applicants are equally well educated, but are younger,
less experienced, more likely to be new graduates, more male, and are less likely to be mar-
ried than LH applicants. Consistent with being younger, NLH are applying to jobs that re-
quest somewhat younger workers and require slightly less experience. Finally, the first row
of Table 1 shows that NLH applicants are substantially more likely than LH applicants to re-
ceive an employer callback: 7.2 percent of applicants with local hukou are contacted by
firms’ HR departments when they apply for a job compared to 8.6 percent for NLH
workers, a gap of 19 percent.
3.3 Estimation framework—interpreting recall regressions
To assess whether other observed characteristics can account for the NLH contact advan-
tage in Table 1, we estimate linear probability regressions for contacts as a function of the
characteristics of the firm placing the ad, the characteristics of the ad itself (primarily the
stated job requirements and the employer’s preferred employee demographics), the match
between the job’s requirements and the applicant’s characteristics, the level of other appli-
cant qualifications that are not specifically requested in the ad, and the amount of compe-
tition for the job (number of applicants and number of positions available).21
Since native and migrant workers are treated differently by the payroll tax system in
many jurisdictions, and since it is often claimed that migrants’ lower wage costs make
them more attractive to employers, the rest of this section develops an interpretive frame-
work for callback regressions that incorporates possible labor cost differentials, which are
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not typically considered in studies of the hiring process, including resume audits. As a
starting point, we suppose that the probability that an application from worker i to job j
receives an employer contact is approximated by the linear relationship:
Pij ¼ aþ b qij−wij−ti− dMi−θj
 
þ eij⋅; ð1Þ
where qij is the firm’s expectation of worker i’s productivity in job j based on the contents of
the resume, wij is the wage the firm expects to pay to worker i in job j, ti is the employer
portion of the payroll tax for that worker, d measures employers’ net distaste for migrants,
Mi is an indicator for migrant status (NLH), θj is an ad-specific expected-quality threshold
for contacting a worker, b > 0 is a scaling parameter, and eij is an iid error term.
22
Suppose further that
qij ¼ Xijβþ εij; ð2Þ
where Xij includes measures of the job’s requirements, the match between the
worker’s qualifications and those requirements, plus additional indicators of the
worker’s absolute ability. Unobserved employer expectations of how productive the
worker is likely to be in the job are captured by εij. It is worth noting that εij has
two conceptually distinct components. One, ε1ij , consists of resume features that
employers see, but which we have not been able to code into our vector of control
variables, Xij. This component is held constant in resume audit studies but not in studies
like ours that use naturally-occurring resumes. The second, ε2ij , includes both an iid com-
ponent of match quality and employers’ forecasts of employee productivity from resume
characteristics, Xij and Mi. These forecasts are not held constant in either estimation ap-
proach. Importantly, then, both our results and those of resume audit studies are best
interpreted as estimates of how employers react to resumes, where those reactions include
both employer tastes and forecasts (whether biased or unbiased) of future productivity
based on observable features of the resume.
We describe employer payroll taxes by:
ti ¼ tN−ΔtMi; ð3Þ
where Δt = tN − tM ≥ 0 is migrants’ payroll tax advantage.
Finally, the effect of expected wages on the callback decision depends on the firm’s wage-
setting process. To explore this, we consider two cases, beginning with the case of posted
wages (Doeringer and Piore 1971; Burdett and Mortensen 1998; Lang et al. 2005).
Case 1: Posted wages
If wages are completely tied to jobs, expected wages can be written as:
wij ¼ wj ð4Þ
In this case, workers who are hired in response to the same ad must be paid the
same wage. This assumption is typically maintained (either explicitly or implicitly) in
resume audit studies, since otherwise the studies would not be informative about
employers’ preferences
Substituting (2)-(4) into (1), the callback probability in Case 1 can be expressed as:
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Pij ¼ a−btN
 
−b d−Δtð ÞMi þ bXijβ− b wj þ θj
 þ eij þ bεij
 
: ð5Þ
A key insight from (5) is that ad fixed effects, b wj þ θj
 
, will absorb any differences
across firms and jobs in hiring standards, θj. More importantly, while it seems intuitive
that employers might prefer migrants “because they are cheap,” equation (5) makes it
clear that the sizable native-migrant wage differentials that are measured in regression
studies of Chinese survey data are not for the most part relevant to the callback gaps
estimated in this paper.23 This is because all native-migrant wage gaps associated with
the possibility that migrants disproportionately apply to (and ultimately work in) low-
wage jobs are also absorbed in our ad fixed effects, b wj þ θj
 
.
Summarizing Case 1, we have:
Result 1: The migrant-native hiring gap when wages are attached to jobs
When two workers who are hired in response to the same job ad must be paid the
same wage, the estimated migrant-native callback gap in the presence of job ad fixed ef-
fects will be given by:
GAP1 ¼ −bd þ bΔt þ b ∂εij=∂Mi; ð6Þ
where ∂εij/∂Mi is the partial regression coefficient of unobserved applicant quality on
migrant status, controlling for all the remaining observables in (5).■
In sum, when wages are attached to jobs, the employer share—and only the employer
share—of payroll taxes affects which workers we expect firms to pick from an applicant
pool. In consequence, the estimated coefficient on Mi in the presence of ad fixed effects
reflects the net impact of three factors: employers’ tastes for hiring migrant workers, −bd,
which we expect to reduce migrants’ callback rates; migrants’ payroll tax advantage, bΔt,
which we expect to raise migrants’ callback rates; and any uncontrolled migrant-native dif-
ferences in expected productivity, b ∂εij/∂Mi.
Case 2: Adding within-job wage differentials
To see how the above conclusions change when there is wage variation between workers
who have been hired for the same job, we consider two possible sources of within-job
wage variation. The first corresponds to shifting of the employer portion of the payroll tax
onto workers. To incorporate within-job tax shifting, we replace (4) by:
wij ¼ wij−φti; ð7Þ
where wij is the wage that would be paid in the absence of a payroll tax and 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 is a
pass-through parameter. If φ = 1, the entire employer portion of payroll taxes is passed on
to workers in the form of lower wages, while φ = 0 corresponds to zero pass-through.24
If taxes are described by (3) it follows that
wij ¼ wij−φtN þ φΔtMi : ð8Þ
According to (8), the effect of within-job shifting of employer payroll taxes is to reduce
natives’ wages below migrants’, since part of natives’ higher employer tax cost is now
passed on to them. One way this might occur is if wages are bargained after a hiring deci-
sion is made, as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), a situation which is more common
in skilled jobs (Brencic 2012). Another possibility is that firms advertise a wage that is
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appropriate for one class of worker (say, NLH), with the understanding that LH applicants
are expected to accept a lower wage to compensate for their higher tax costs.25
A second possible source of within-job wage differentials for new hires is related to
employer monopsony power. If, on average, migrants have less attractive labor market
alternatives than natives, employers in a world without payroll taxes might be able to
pay migrants less than equally-productive natives (Hotchkiss and Quispe-Agnoli 2009,
Depew et al. 2013, Hirsch and Jahn 2015). To model this, let the baseline wage, wij , in
(7) equal wNj þ νi for natives and wMj þ νi for migrants, where νi captures idiosyn-
cratic worker bargaining power that is uncorrelated with migrant status. It follows that
wij ¼ wNj −ΔwMi þ νi; ð9Þ
where Δw ¼ wNj −wMj is the monopsony-related cost advantage of hiring migrants,
which is positive if migrants have worse outside options. Combining (8) and (9) yields:
wij ¼ wNj −φtN
h i
þ φΔt−Δwð ÞMi þ νi ð10Þ
In this more general setting, the wage the employer expects to pay is the sum of a
job-specific intercept wNj −φt
N
h i
a term representing idiosyncratic worker wage bar-
gaining power νi, and a within-job migrant wage differential (φΔ
t − Δw *)Mi. This latter
term represents the net impact of shifting of employer tax rates onto workers (which
tends to raise migrants’ wages relative to natives) and a monopsony effect, which we
expect to have the opposite effect.
Substituting (10) into (1) yields:
Pij ¼ a−btN 1−φð Þ
 
−b d−Δt 1−φð Þ−Δw½ Mi þ bXijβ−b θj þ wNj
h i




Result 2: The migrant-native hiring gap with within-job wage differentials
When two workers who are hired in response to the same job ad can be paid different
wages, the estimated migrant-native callback gap in the presence of job ad fixed effects
will be given by:
GAP2 ¼ −bd þ bΔt þ b Δw−φΔtð Þ þ b∂εij=∂Mi: ð12Þ
Compared to (6), (12) has two additional terms reflecting the effect of within-job wage
differentials (if any) between natives and migrants. One of these, bΔw *, is the effect of any
additional monopsony power employers might have over migrant workers, due to their
poorer labor market alternatives. Any such power should reduce the wage employers ex-
pect to pay migrant workers relative to natives, thereby raising (i.e., helping to explain)
migrants’ callback advantage. The other, − bφΔt, reflects shifting of natives’ payroll tax dis-
advantage into the wages paid to natives. Any such shifting should increase migrants’ rela-
tive wage costs (compared to the posted-wages baseline), thereby reducing (i.e., making it
harder to explain) migrants’ callback advantage. In the following section, we shall argue
that it is possible to bound the relative magnitude of these two factors by looking at data
on the current wages of job applicants. Notably, as is formalized in equation (12), a
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situation where these two factors just balance each other is observationally identical to
the much simpler case where wages are tied to jobs (Case 1).
4 Results
Table 2 presents linear probability estimates of equation (11), where the dependent vari-
able equals one if the applicant was contacted by the firm’s HR department after applying
to the ad.26 Column 1 contains no regressors other than NLH; it replicates Table 1’s find-
ing that, on average, NLH workers were 1.4 percentage points (or 19 percent) more likely
to receive an employer contact than LH workers.27 Column 2 adds controls for basic
characteristics of the job ad (specifically the requested levels of education, age, experience,
gender, and whether a new graduate or technical school graduate is sought) plus measures
of the match between those characteristics and the worker’s actual characteristics Xij. Also
included are controls for the advertised wage, the worker’s gender, and the worker’s tech-
nical school and new graduate status. Column (2) shows that workers who are older than
the job’s preferred age range and of a different gender than the firm requests are signifi-
cantly less likely to receive a callback than workers who meet these hiring criteria.
Column 3 adds controls for a more detailed set of CV characteristics that are available
in our data. These are whether the applicant attended a technical school, the applicant’s
zhicheng rank (6 categories), whether the CV is in English, the number of schools
attended, the number of job experience spells, and the number of certifications reported.28
The following characteristics are also included, both as main effects and interacted with
the applicant’s gender: myopia, height, and marital status. Occupation fixed effects (for
the job) are added in column 4. Column 5 adds two indicators of the amount of competi-
tion for the job in question, specifically the number of positions available and the number
of persons who applied to the ad. Both of these indicators have strong effects in the ex-
pected directions; adding them increases the estimated NLH effect somewhat. Overall,
however, between columns 1 and 5 there is some attenuation in the NLH coefficient as
controls are added, reducing the size of the estimated effect from 1.38 percentage points
in column 1 to 1.13 percentage points in column 5. Intuitively, this attenuation is
accounted for by the fact that NLH workers apply to jobs to which they are somewhat
better matched (column 1 to 2) and are slightly more qualified in terms of detailed resume
characteristics (column 3).29
Column 6 replaces the occupation fixed effects by fixed effects for job cells, defined as
the interaction of firms and (requested) occupations. Thus, column 6 compares observa-
tionally identical LH and NLH workers who have applied for a job in the same occupation
in the same firm (though not necessarily in response to the same ad). This reduces the es-
timated size of the NLH effect substantially (to 0.81 percentage points). It follows that part
of the unadjusted NLH advantage in column 1 (at least (.0113-.081)/.0138 = 23 percent)
results from a tendency for NLH workers to disproportionately apply to job cells with
higher overall callback rates.30 Thus, as argued earlier, group differentials in callback rates
depend on the sample of job ads that is considered; in our case the overall callback advan-
tage of NLH workers is explained, in part, by the fact that they disproportionately apply to
jobs that are “easier to get”.
Our most saturated specification in column 7 replaces column 6’s job cell fixed effects
with a full set of job ad fixed effects, thus effectively comparing the success rates of LH and
NLH workers who have applied to the same ad. As noted earlier, column 7’s fixed effects
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Table 2 Effects of Non-Local Hukou on the probability of employer contact, linear probability models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Non-Local Hukou (NLH) 0.0138*** (0.0029) 0.0124*** (0.0026) 0.0111*** (0.0026) 0.0098*** (0.0025) 0.0113*** (0.0024) 0.0081*** (0.0019) 0.0079*** (0.0019)
Education less than requested1 −0.0070 (0.0052) −0.0104* (0.0058) −0.0107* (0.0056) −0.0096* (0.0056) −0.0092*** (0.0027) −0.0090*** (0.0026)
Education more than requested1 −0.0018 (0.0034) 0.0017 (0.0039) 0.0006 (0.0039) −0.0001 (0.0039) 0.0009 (0.0017) 0.0011 (0.0017)
Age less than requested2 −0.0018 (0.0059) −0.0027 (0.0060) −0.0030 (0.0060) −0.0005 (0.0054) −0.0103*** (0.0033) −0.0125*** (0.0033)
Age more than requested2 −0.0304*** (0.0090) −0.0289*** (0.0090) −0.0274*** (0.0086) −0.0176** (0.0076) −0.0228*** (0.0074) −0.0279*** (0.0079)
Experience less than requested3 −0.0064 (0.0057) −0.0068 (0.0057) −0.0077 (0.0054) −0.0106** (0.0053) −0.0108*** (0.0025) −0.0109*** (0.0025)
Experience more than requested3 0.0000 (0.0033) 0.0005 (0.0028) −0.0001 (0.0027) 0.0005 (0.0026) −0.0017 (0.0017) −0.0017 (0.0017)
Sex differs from requested −0.0120** (0.0052) −0.0119** (0.0052) −0.0092* (0.0049) −0.0065 (0.0045) −0.0063* (0.0034) −0.0054* (0.0032)
Number of positions advertised (/100) 0.5598** (0.2309) 0.2842 (0.2106)
Number of applicants (/100) −0.0141*** (0.0028) −0.0097*** (0.0024)
Detailed CV controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation fixed effects No No No Yes Yes No No
Occupation*Firm fixed effects No No No No No Yes No
Ad fixed effects No No No No No No Yes
Observations 221,135 221,135 221,135 221,135 221,135 221,135 221,135
R-squared 0.0002 0.0050 0.0053 0.0172 0.0278 0.2749 0.2981
Education matching based on five ordered categories in the ad and resume: primary (6 years), junior middle (9 years), technical or high school (11–12 years), college (15 years), and university (16 years). Age matching
variables refer to whether the applicant’s age is below, within, or above the requested age range. Experience matching variables refer to whether the applicant’s experience is below, 0–2 years above, or more than
3 years above the requested experience level. In addition to the covariates shown, columns 2–7 include the following: the job’s requested education level (5 categories), requested experience level (quadratic),
requested age level (quadratic in midpoint of range), requested gender (male, female, not specified), advertised wage (quadratic in midpoint of bin; 8 bins). Also included are dummies for and whether the worker is
female, whether a new graduate is requested, for whether the worker is a new graduate, for whether the worker’s new graduate status matches the employer’s request. We also control for whether technical school is
specifically requested, whether the worker attended technical school, and the match between these. Indicators for missing age and wage information for either the ad or the worker are also included, where relevant.
Columns 3–7 add controls for the following worker (CV) characteristics (these characteristics are not mentioned in job ads very often): the applicant’s Zhicheng rank (6 categories), whether the CV is in English, the
number of schools attended, number of job experience spells, number of certifications reported, applicant height (interacted with applicant gender), an indicator for myopia (interacted with applicant gender), and














absorb any wage that is attached to the job as well as job-specific hiring standards. These es-
timates are identified only by the sample of job ads that received at least one NLH applicant
and one LH applicant. Compared to column 6, they leave the NLH coefficient essentially
unchanged. An interesting feature of columns 6 and 7 is that several indicators of job-
worker mismatch (specifically whether the worker is less educated than requested, younger
than requested, and less experienced than requested) that were insignificant in less saturated
specifications are now associated with highly significant reductions in callbacks. Part of this
effect is due to a reduction in standard errors relative to columns 2–5, suggesting that fo-
cusing on within-ad competition for jobs improves the precision of our estimates.
Comparing columns (1) and (7), the NLH coefficient attenuates by .58 percentage points
(.0138 - .0079) between columns 1 and 7, which might be a cause for concern if there are
important features of workers’ resumes we have not adequately been able to code into our
control variables. Importantly, however, note that only .13 points (or 22 percent) of this at-
tenuation (i.e., the gap between columns 2 and 3) results from adding finer controls for re-
sume characteristics. The remainder results from increasingly detailed controls for where
applicants are directing their applications. Thus, as argued earlier, naturally occurring job
board data provides information on how overall gaps in job search success between groups
of workers are affected by those workers’ directed search strategies. According to Table 2,
the within-job hiring gap of .8 percentage points in column (7) understates the aggregate
gap of .14 percentage points in column (1) because migrant workers choose to target their
job applications less aggressively than local workers, focusing on jobs that are, on average,
‘easier to get.’ From a welfare point of view, it is not clear whether column (1) or column
(7) is more relevant.
In sum, Table 2 presents evidence that NLH workers have a higher chance of receiv-
ing an employer callback than observationally-equivalent LH workers when both
groups of workers are competing for the same private-sector job. In our most saturated
specification, NLH workers have a callback advantage of 0.8 percentage points, or 11
percent, an effect which is highly statistically significant. In the following section, we
consider the plausibility of various explanations for this gap by exploring how the size
of the gap varies across types of ads, firms and workers.
5 What explains firms’ preferences for NLH workers?
According to equation (12) there are four broad types of factors that could explain NLH
workers’ callback advantage: employers’ tastes (−d); the direct effect of LH workers’ higher
payroll taxes, Δt; within-job wage gaps between LH and NLH workers (Δw * − φΔt); and
the possibility that migrants are on average more productive than observationally identical
natives (∂εij/∂Mi). The first of these is not a likely explanation of the NLH callback advan-
tage, since available evidence from other sources suggests that if anything Chinese urban
residents are either indifferent or have some distastes for interacting with non-local
workers (Dulleck et al. 2012). In the remainder of this section, we draw on various pieces
of evidence to attempt to assess the importance of the remaining three.
5.1 Payroll tax differentials
If NLH workers’ payroll tax advantage is the main explanation of their higher callback
rate, one would expect their callback advantage to be most pronounced in situations
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where their payroll tax advantage is the greatest. To pursue this idea, note that during
our sample period employers of LH workers in Xiamen paid 21 percent of the worker’s
monthly salary (with a minimum and maximum basis) to city’s retirement and health
insurance programs. For NLH workers, these contributions were set at a fixed, low
amount that is unrelated to the worker’s wage rate. The exact formulas and their
consequences for average tax rates at typical salaries in our sample are shown in
Appendix 2, which shows a roughly constant employer tax rate gap of about 19
percent between the two worker types across the entire wage distribution in our
sample (column 3). The absolute tax differential in column (4), on the other hand,
increases with earnings. Both these properties also apply to total (employer plus
employee-paid) taxes (in columns 5–8). Thus, depending on whether the total tax
difference (in yuan) or the difference in tax rates is most relevant to employers’
callback decisions, NLH workers’ payroll tax advantage is either increasing or
roughly constant across job skill levels.
To see if NLH workers’ callback advantage conforms to either of these patterns
across skill levels, Table 3 estimates a different effect of NLH status on the call-
back rate for four levels of required education, while Table 4 does the same for
four advertised wage bins. For both wages and education levels we find the oppos-
ite pattern from what is predicted by NLH workers’ payroll tax advantage: firms’
revealed preferences for NLH workers are considerably stronger at low skill levels
than higher ones. With respect to education, the NLH advantage is strongest—at
1.7 percentage points—in jobs requiring junior middle school (9 years of educa-
tion), much smaller (0.9 points) in jobs requiring senior middle or tech school, 0.6
percentage points in college-level jobs, and small and insignificant for university-
level jobs. For advertised wage levels, the trend is similar: the NLH hiring
Table 3 Effects of Non-Local Hukou (NLH) on contact rate, by required education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
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Ad-worker match controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Detailed CV controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes No No
Job Competition Controls No No No No Yes Yes No
Occ*Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes No
Ad Fixed Effects No No No No No No Yes
Observations 209,353 209,353 209,353 209,353 209,353 209,353 209,353
R-squared 0.0016 0.0042 0.0046 0.0175 0.0272 0.2725 0.2931
See notes to Table 2 for detailed regression specifications. Sample restricted to ads with non-missing education requirements.
Sample shares in the four education groups are: Junior Middle or less .144; Senior Middle/Tech .347; College .428; University
.081. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by ad.***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Kuhn and Shen IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2015) 4:22 Page 15 of 31
Table 4 Effects of Non-Local Hukou (NLH) on contact rate, by the job’s posted wage level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Posted Wage:
1000−2000 yuan/month 0.0143** (0.0065) 0.0155 (0.0097) 0.0140 (0.0097) 0.0108 (0.0095) 0.0077 (0.0095) 0.0135*** (0.0043) 0.0138*** (0.0042)
2000−4000 yuan/month 0.0077 (0.0055) 0.0066 (0.0067) 0.0045 (0.0066) 0.0042 (0.0063) 0.0078 (0.0063) 0.0068* (0.0035) 0.0070** (0.0034)
4000−6000 yuan/month 0.0429* (0.0226) 0.0341 (0.0281) 0.0327 (0.0280) 0.0359 (0.0277) 0.0388 (0.0271) 0.0178 (0.0169) 0.0010 (0.0113)
6000−10000 yuan/month 0.0337 (0.0210) −0.0221 (0.0445) −0.0235 (0.0445) −0.0170 (0.0446) −0.0036 (0.0427) −0.0404 (0.0316) −0.0209 (0.0283)
Ad-worker match controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Detailed CV controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes No No
Job Competition Controls No No No No Yes Yes No
Occupation*Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes No
Ad Fixed Effects No No No No No No Yes
Observations 129,957 129,957 129,957 129,957 129,957 129,957 129,957
R-squared 0.0009 0.0050 0.0054 0.0135 0.0225 0.2516 0.2662
See notes to Table 2 for detailed regression specifications. Sample restricted to jobs with posted wages. Sample shares in the four wage groups are: 1000–2000: .387; 2000–4000: .558; 4000–6000: .044;














advantage is highly statistically significant, at 1.4 percentage points, in jobs adver-
tising a wage below 2,000 yuan per month, half that size in jobs paying 2,000-
4,000 yuan per month, and absent at higher wage levels.
Overall, the fact that the NLH hiring advantage in our data is strongly concentrated
among less-skilled and low-paid jobs is inconsistent with a scenario in which statutory
payroll tax differences between LH and NLH workers are the only explanation of the
callback gap.31 At a minimum, one or more additional factors, which disproportionately
make less-skilled NLH workers more attractive to employers, must also be at work. We
discuss a number of such factors in the remainder of this section.
5.2 Within-job wage differentials
Equation (12) indicates that NLH workers’ relative callback rates should also depend on any
expected wage differentials between NLH and LH workers who are hired in response to the
same job ad. If within-job wage gaps primarily reflect payroll tax shifting, we would expect
natives to be paid less than migrants; this would reduce the relative attractiveness of migrant
workers and cancel out some or all of the direct effect of employer-paid payroll taxes. On
the other hand, if monopsonistic wage discrimination against migrants dominates, we
would expect natives to be paid more than migrants, which would raise migrants’ relative
attractiveness. If these two factors roughly cancel each other out, or if within-job wage dis-
crimination is not possible, we should not see within-job wage gaps between natives and
migrants, and they cannot help us explain the NLH callback advantage.
We do not, of course, observe whether employers expect or plan to pay different wages to
LH and NLH workers who apply to the same job in our data. Still, two features of our data
help us place some bounds on the likely effects of these types of wage gaps. One is that we
can distinguish between job ads that did or did not post a wage; if it is harder to wage
discriminate between worker types when a wage is posted in the job ad we should
see a different callback gap in the two types of jobs. (The sign of the difference depends,
again, on Δw * − φΔt). To see if this is the case, we estimated callback regressions that inter-
act the NLH effect with whether the job ad posted a wage.32 No statistically significant inter-
action effects were estimated in any specification. Second, recall as Table 1 indicates that
almost 70 percent of applicants list a current wage on their resume. If the wage currently
earned by a job applicant is a rough lower bound for what a firm must pay to hire that ap-
plicant, the current wage will give us some indication of the scope available to employers to
pay different wages to NLH and LH workers who have applied to the same job.
Table 5 presents NLH coefficients from the same regressions as our main results (in
Table 2), but where the dependent variable is the log of the worker’s current wage as listed
on their XMRC profile. To allow us to focus on the job types where the NLH hiring advan-
tage is present, Table 5 estimates separate applicant wage differentials for jobs requiring
below versus above 12 years of education, and for jobs posting a wage below versus above
4,000 yuan per month. Focusing first on the raw data in column 1, we see (as one might ex-
pect) that NLH workers applying to less skilled and low paying jobs have current wages that
are below those earned by native applicants. Interestingly, the opposite is true for NLH
workers applying to highly skilled, high paying jobs. NLH university graduates seeking work
in Xiamen have very good current jobs compared to Xiamen’s local university-educated
applicants.
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More importantly, comparing equally-qualified workers who have applied to the same
jobs (which is the relevant comparison for understanding our main result), column 7
shows a very different pattern. In applicant pools for skilled jobs, the current wages of
NLH applicants are the same as those of native applicants. In applicant pools for un-
skilled jobs, however, the current wages of NLH applicants are two to four percent
higher than natives. Again, this is because migrants target their applications a little less
aggressively (in terms of wages relative to their current wage) than natives. The impli-
cation for employers of less-skilled workers on XMRC is that employers who want to
match the wages their applicants are currently earning elsewhere would need, on aver-
age, to pay a migrant two to four percent more than natives. This strongly suggests that
lower migrant wages within jobs are an unlikely explanation of the NLH callback ad-
vantage. Further, such a two to four percent wage discount for natives contrasts with a
direct additional employer payroll tax bill (from Appendix 2) of 16 to 19 percent. Thus,
it seems highly unlikely that firms will be able to pay natives sufficiently less than mi-
grants within jobs to undo migrants’ payroll tax advantage.
In sum, if applicants’ current wages set meaningful constraints on what firms must pay
to hire workers, within-job wage discrimination against migrants is not a likely explan-
ation of the NLH hiring advantage. Applicants’ current wages also suggest that within-job
payroll tax shifting onto natives would not be able to undo much more than a small frac-
tion of natives’ higher direct payroll tax costs. Together, this means we can largely ignore
the component of GAP2 related to within-job wage differentials, b(Δw * − φΔt), leaving only
Table 5 Regressions of applicants’ current log wages on NLH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. By Job’s Required Education Level:
NLH * Low Education −0.0493*** 0.0505*** 0.0593*** 0.0558*** 0.0564*** 0.0433*** 0.0427***
(6 – 12 years) (0.0096) (0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0045) (0.0045)
NLH * High Education 0.0455*** −0.0139*** −0.0080* −0.0068 −0.0063 −0.0066 −0.0060
(15 or 16 years) (0.0100) (0.0051) (0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0043) (0.0043)
Observations 153,718 153,718 153,718 153,718 153,718 153,718 153,718
R-squared 0.0143 0.3111 0.3318 0.3424 0.3427 0.4031 0.4189
B. By Job’s Posted Wage:
NLH * Low Wage −0.0216*** 0.0210*** 0.0284*** 0.0278*** 0.0279*** 0.0221*** 0.0218***
(1,000-4,000 yuan/month) (0.0065) (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0039) (0.0038)
NLH * High Wage 0.3704*** 0.0507** 0.0510*** 0.0495*** 0.0491*** 0.0098 0.0117
(4,000-10,000 yuan/month) (0.0258) (0.0212) (0.0194) (0.0183) (0.0178) (0.0181) (0.0218)
Observations 91,224 91,224 91,224 91,224 91,224 91,224 91,224
R-squared 0.0597 0.3186 0.3345 0.3425 0.3429 0.3897 0.3981
Specifications for all Panels:
Ad-worker match controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Detailed CV controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes No No
Job Competition Controls No No No No Yes Yes No
Occupation*Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes No
Ad Fixed Effects No No No No No No Yes
See notes to Table 2 for detailed regression specifications. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by ad. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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the direct effect of employer payroll taxes and productivity differentials as remaining can-
didate explanations for the NLH callback advantage.
5.3 Productivity gaps—selection
We now turn to the final term in equation (12): the possibility that employers expect
migrants to be on average more productive than observationally identical natives when
making callback decisions (∂εij/∂Mi > 0). We can think of a number of reasons why this
might be the case and can only provide a few pieces of evidence regarding which ones
might be most relevant. Sources of migrant-native productivity gaps fall into two main
categories, the first of which is selection, i.e., uncontrolled productivity differentials that
are time-invariant features of the employee.
One possible source of differential selection is the notion that NLH migrants may be
perceived by employers as being positively selected relative to their compatriots who
chose to remain behind in poorer parts of China (Borjas 1987). An important caveat to
this explanation, however, is the fact that positive selection relative to stayers in the ori-
gin region does not imply positive selection relative to natives in the destination city.
Indeed, if anything, we would probably expect NLH workers to suffer deficits relative
to LH workers in education quality, connections (guanxi) and other destination-specific
skills, which would all appear as negative selection on unobservables in our regressions.
Thus, positive selection of out-migrants from other provinces can only explain our
main result if it outweighs these likely skill disadvantages.
A second type of selection that could account for our result is negative selection of
LH workers into formal search for private-sector jobs on XMRC. Is it possible that LH
workers who choose to look for work in Xiamen’s private sector are on average less
able than the typical LH worker? Evidence on selection into SOEs from the period
before Premier Zhu’s “letting go of the small” SOE reforms in the late 1990s actually
suggests the opposite: at that time the nascent private sector attracted workers who
were more ambitious and risk tolerant (He et al. 2014). Since those reforms, however,
SOE jobs have become much scarcer and pay well relative to urban private sector jobs
(Du and Wang, 2013). Thus, it is possible that the subset of Xiamen’s LH workers who
are looking for private sector work on XMRC during our sample period are negatively
selected (in the same way that U.S.-born workers who apply to low-wage jobs occupied
mostly by temporary migrants may also be negatively selected). If so, that could ac-
count for the NLH callback advantage in our data.
5.4 Productivity gaps—hours and effort
The other potential source of migrant-native productivity gaps is different choices made by
workers of the same ability. Here, the most likely candidates are effort and labor supply de-
cisions that make migrants more desirable to employers.33 One commonly-cited reason for
such oft-cited “immigrants work harder” effects is an efficiency wage effect: to the extent that
migrants’ outside options are poorer than natives’, migrants should be willing to exert more
effort to keep their jobs. Two of our key results in this paper, however, are inconsistent with
this idea. One is the fact that the current wages listed by NLH workers on their resumes are
higher than those of natives who applied to the same ad, especially in jobs with low skill re-
quirements (where the NLH hiring advantage is concentrated). The other is the paper’s
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main result: NLH workers searching for work on XMRC have higher recall rates than urban
natives, so they should have an easier time finding alternative employment. These caveats
noted, however, there may be some outside options not visible in our data that are better
for LH workers than migrants. Such options include better access to the urban social safety
net (documented in Appendix 1), higher nonlabor income (including apartment rentals),
and preferred access to attractive, secure public sector and SOE jobs. It is possible that these
outside options reduce natives’ work incentives, thereby making them less attractive to pri-
vate sector employers.
The second reason why effort and hours choices might differ between natives and
migrants is intertemporal labor supply substitution: to the extent that NLH workers
come from, and expect to return to a lower-wage region of origin, NLH workers have
an incentive to reallocate work hours and effort from other stages of their lifetime into
the time they are in the destination city (Dustmann 2000). If employers prefer workers
with such higher attachment to work, the intertemporal labor substitution hypothesis
predicts that employers should prefer NLH workers from poor provinces to NLH
workers from rich provinces (since workers from poor provinces have lower wages at
other points in their life cycle). Note that this prediction contrasts with what we might
expect from simple human capital models, which suggest that the lower quality of edu-
cation, poorer health, and lower familiarity with modern work practices in poorer re-
gions would hurt those residents’ employment prospects in Xiamen.
To explore this prediction, Fig. 1 plots the unadjusted NLH advantage in our data against
the mean GDP per capita in an NLH applicant’s province of hukou. It shows very high call-
back rates for applicants from China’s two poorest provinces—Guizhou and Yunnan—, low
callback rates from richer areas like Guangdong and Inner Mongolia, and very few appli-
cants to jobs in Xiamen from the richest areas: Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin. The linear re-
gression line in the Figure shows a clear negative relationship between per-capita GDP in
Fig. 1 Mean Callback Rates of NLH Applicants by Origin Province’s per capita GDP. Notes: Symbol size is
proportional to the number of observations from the source province. Linear regression line is weighted by
number of observations from the province; 95% confidence band is shown
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the sending region and workers’ callback rates from employers in Xiamen. To quantify this
relationship, Table 6 adds four regressors to the specification in Table 2. The first is a fixed
effect for whether the NLH applicant is not from Fujian (the province in which Xiamen is
located); this allows us to see whether interprovincial applicants, as a group, are treated dif-
ferently from intraprovincial ones. The next two variables interact interprovincial migrant
status with the railroad distance of the applicant’s home province from Fujian and its level
of per capita income. Among other things, distance might affect the chances an applicant
would accept the job offer if he applied while living in the hukou province. Finally, we add a
control for the migrant’s current wage (i.e., the dependent variable in Table 5) to isolate the
effect of coming from a poor region (as distinct from having different labor market alterna-
tives in the destination city).
Consistent with an intertemporal labor supply interpretation of the NLH advantage, row
3 of Table 6 shows that the NLH callback advantage decreases with the origin province’s
per capita GDP, reflecting the pattern in Fig. 1. While not statistically significant in every
specification, this effect is significant (at 5 percent) in the absence of controls (column 1)
and (at 10 percent) in our most saturated specifications (columns 6 and 7), which control
for job cell and job ad fixed effects respectively. While hardly definitive, we see Table 6’s re-
sults as supportive of the intertemporal labor supply hypothesis.34
5.5 Why is the NLH callback advantage absent at higher skill levels?
So far we have argued that payroll tax and expected productivity differences are
the most likely causes of the NLH callback advantage in our data. Neither of these
hypotheses on their own, however, can account for the fact that the NLH callback
advantage is only observed in the less-skilled jobs posted on XMRC: the tax hy-
pothesis predicts either a constant or increasing NLH callback advantage with skill,
and so far we have not provided any reasons why NLH workers’ productivity ad-
vantage might be confined to less skilled workers. In this final subsection we dis-
cuss a number of factors that might attenuate NLH workers’ tax and productivity
advantages at high skill levels relative to lower skill levels.
In our review of China’s hukou system, we noted that some Chinese cities make it easier
for skilled workers than unskilled workers to acquire a local hukou. If this type of hukou
conversion is sufficiently quick and common among skilled NLH workers, it could eliminate
the tax and efficiency wage advantages of hiring them, compared to skilled LH workers.
Data from the 2005 Census, however, suggests that hukou conversion rates within the first
five years of residence in a new location are very low, even for college graduates: 87 percent
of young, urban college graduates who lived in a different location five years before the Cen-
sus date did not have their hukou in their current city.35 Thus it seems unlikely that hukou
conversion can explain why the NLH callback gap is absent at high skill levels.
Another possibility is income effects of the much more generous education, health and
retirement benefits available to LH than NLH workers. Since these income effects are
likely to be more important for unskilled workers, they could disproportionately reduce
LH workers’ hours and effort levels at low skill levels, making them less attractive to em-
ployers than unskilled migrants who are not entitled to these benefits. The intertemporal
labor substitution effects discussed in Section 5.4 will be also stronger for unskilled mi-
grants than skilled migrants if, as seems likely, their wages in Xiamen differ more from
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Table 6 Effects of origin provinces’ GDP on the probability of employer contact for Non-Local Hukou (NLH)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Non-Local Hukou (NLH) 0.0112** (0.0047) 0.0100** (0.0043) 0.0083* (0.0042) 0.0072* (0.0040) 0.0087** (0.0039) 0.0088*** (0.0032) 0.0092*** (0.0033)
Other than Fujian (Local) Province (OH) 0.0008 (0.0035) 0.0007 (0.0035) −0.0003 (0.0034) −0.0020 (0.0033) −0.0036 (0.0033) −0.0019 (0.0027) −0.0020 (0.0027)
OH*Origin Province’s per capita GDP −0.0085** (0.0041) −0.0074* (0.0038) −0.0068* (0.0038) −0.0068* (0.0037) −0.0068* (0.0036) −0.0071** (0.0032) −0.0056* (0.0032)
OH*Log of Railroad Distance (in km) 0.0026 (0.0033) 0.0028 (0.0033) 0.0023 (0.0033) 0.0018 (0.0032) 0.0009 (0.0032) 0.0025 (0.0029) 0.0017 (0.0028)
Applicant’s Current Wage −0.0004 (0.0021) 0.0003 (0.0020) −0.0000 (0.0019) 0.0000 (0.0020) −0.0031** (0.0013) −0.0027** (0.0014)
Ad-worker match controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Detailed CV controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes No No
Job Competition Controls No No No No Yes Yes No
Occupation*Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes No
Ad Fixed Effects No No No No No No Yes
Ad-worker match controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Detailed CV controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 91,223 91,223 91,223 91,223 91,223 91,223 91,223
R-squared 0.0002 0.0049 0.0054 0.0136 0.0226 0.2552 0.2726
See Table 2 for regression specifications. Sample is identical to Table 5B, dropping Tibet which has only one observation. Per capita GDP refers to 2008–2010, measured in logs and standardized. Railroad distance
(from Bodvarsson et al. 2014) is between the capital cities of the origin province and Fujian and is normalized to have a mean of zero for the non-Fujian provinces. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by ad.














their home-province wages than do the wages of skilled migrants. Finally, and perhaps
most likely, there may be production complementarities between skill and local ex-
perience. If knowing that a worker comes from and will remain in the city is more
important to employers of skilled than unskilled workers, this will favor skilled LH
workers in the competition for callbacks. Put another way, employers of skilled
workers may care more about long term relationships and location-specific skills,
and be less interested in the cost savings or higher short-term effort levels associ-
ated with hiring temporary migrants.
6 Conclusion
To our knowledge this is the first paper to study employers’ hiring choices between
equally-qualified workers with and without permanent residence permits in the region
of employment. Our main finding is that despite other evidence of taste-based dis-
crimination against persons without permanent status (NLH) in China’s cities, and
despite the fact that NLH workers likely have lower levels of destination-specific
skills than natives, employers in our data are more likely to call back identically-
matched NLH than LH applicants to the same job. Further, this preference for mi-
grant workers is confined to situations where firms are seeking to fill less-skilled
and lower-paid positions.
What might account for migrant workers’ estimated callback advantage in our
data? Since the advantage is confined to less skilled positions, we argue that em-
ployers’ payroll tax savings on NLH workers (which are either skill neutral or
favor skilled NLH workers) cannot be the only explanation, suggesting that tem-
porary migrant workers may have a productivity advantage over natives in less
skilled and low paid jobs. Possible sources of such an advantage include differen-
tial selection of LH and NLH workers into active search for low-skilled private
sector urban jobs, and different effort and labor supply decisions while in the des-
tination city. For example, preferred access to secure, well paid SOE and public
sector jobs and greater coverage by the urban social safety net could reduce less-
skilled LH workers’ work incentives in a way that makes them less attractive to
private sector employers. At the same time, intertemporal labor substitution effects
might account for high observed levels of hours and effort among temporary mi-
grants, making them more attractive to employers. These and other sources of a
migrant productivity advantage will be muted in jobs with higher skill require-
ments if, as seems plausible, skill is complementary with LH workers’ local labor
market experience, connections and knowledge. We stress that the above are only
possible sources of a migrant productivity advantage in low paid jobs and that
much additional work is needed to understand the source and robustness of such
an advantage.
While we believe that our findings are thought-provoking, we also emphasize that
they should be interpreted with a number of important caveats in mind. One is the fact
that—as in all correspondence studies—our dependent variable measures callbacks
only, not whether a worker ultimately receives a job offer. As a result, our main result
could be in jeopardy if firms systematically make fewer offers per callback to NLH than
LH workers, provided they do this more at low skill levels than high ones. While we
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cannot rule this out, it is hard to think of plausible reasons why callback and offer pat-
terns might differ in this way.36
Second, recall that our data are for private-sector jobs exclusively; thus, our results
say nothing about the preferences of public-sector employers and state-owned enter-
prises, which according to the 2005 Census account for a majority of the jobs held by
LH workers in China’s major cities.37 Indeed, since public sector and SOE jobs are
sometimes explicitly reserved for LH workers, our results are consistent with a seg-
mented labor market scenario in which—holding match quality fixed—private-sector
employers tend to prefer NLH workers, while public service and SOE employers give
preference to LH workers. Indeed, the latter sectors, which are generally not exposed
to significant competitive pressures in product markets, may play an important role in
sheltering native workers from competition with the massive influx of migrants in
many Chinese cities.38
Finally, we emphasize that the unique nature of China’s hukou system clearly
limits the relevance of our results to workers with insecure or limited residency
rights in other jurisdictions. For example, unlike unskilled temporary migrants in
the U.S. (many of whom are undocumented), NLH workers are not at risk of
summary deportation. And unlike H-1B visaholders who are subject to U.S. Social
Security and Medicare taxation (Thibodeau, 2010), skilled NLH workers pay dif-
ferent payroll taxes than their native counterparts. Still, in the Chinese context,
our results suggest quite strongly (and perhaps paradoxically) that—at least at
low skill levels—learning that a worker has limited residency rights in a city ap-
pears to make that city’s employers more interested in hiring that worker.
Endnotes
1For recent examples of both these claims, see Nir’s (2015) description of the labor
market for nail salon workers in New York.
2In part, this is because very few databases include information on individuals’ resi-
dency or visa status. Oreopoulos (2011) studies Canadian employers’ choices between
natives and persons with Asian-sounding names, but the latter are predominantly per-
manent residents.
3Likely for cost reasons, resume audits tend to use quite constrained samples.
Both Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) and Kroft et al. (2013) restrict their atten-
tion to four occupations: sales, administrative support, clerical, and customer ser-
vice. Oreopoulos (2011) considers more occupations, but restricts his attention to
jobs that required three to seven years of experience and an undergraduate degree,
and to applications that possess those qualifications.
4While it is possible to shed some light on the role of these expectations by ma-
nipulating the amount of information contained in resumes, both our approach
and resume audit studies are probably best interpreted as estimates of how em-
ployers ‘read’ resumes, i.e., as estimating the effects of learning that a person be-
longs to a certain group on the probability of giving the worker a callback.
5The simplest example of such a model is Becker’s (1971) model of taste-based em-
ployer discrimination. In that (frictionless) model, employers have heterogeneous dis-
tastes for interacting with one of the two worker types. An equilibrium wage gap clears
the market and workers are segregated by type across employers. While neither group
Kuhn and Shen IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2015) 4:22 Page 24 of 31
has a hiring advantage overall—in the sense that both will be hired for sure if they
apply to the ‘right’ job—, the disfavored group will be turned away from the ‘good’ (high
wage) jobs, and the favored group will be turned away from the bad jobs if they apply
there.
6Additional details on the evolving structure of China’s hukou system are available in
Chan and Buckingham (2008); Bao, Bodvarsson, Hou and Zhao (2009); and Démurger
and Xu (2013), on which we draw in this brief description.
7Such restrictions could impact the labor market via income effects from the apart-
ment rental market, which is reportedly an important income source for many LH
persons.
8See Li (2010) regarding lawyers and Standing Committee of the Beijing Municipal
People’s Congress (2002) regarding taxi drivers. Hukou-based requirements for hotel
front desk personnel and KFC employment have been claimed by a number of com-
mentators on social media.
9Aluminum Corporation of China (2012) is an ad for new college and university
graduates placed by a large SOE. The company advertises an explicit recruitment
quota of 30 percent LH and 70 percent NLH, but adds the following note at the
bottom of the ad: “Note: Beijing students, education can be relaxed”.
10“Major cities” are the four cities under direct central government control (Beijing,
Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing), plus the fifteen sub-provincial cities, which include
Xiamen. These city groups are sometimes referred to informally as China’s “Tier 1” and
“Tier 2” cities.
1170 and 73 percent are the NLH share in private enterprises (the main em-
ployers on the XMRC job board) implied by the employer type distribution in
Appendix 1.
12Recruiting for public sector and SOE jobs occurs via other channels. Recruiting
for unskilled workers takes place primarily via XMZYJS (the Xia-Zhang-Quan 3-
city public job board www.xmzyjs.com), which is the only other major job board
based in Xiamen. XMZYJS is operated directly by the Xiamen Labor Bureau, a
local government department focusing on unskilled workers. It does not post
worker resumes and does not provide a mechanism for firms and workers to con-
tact each other through their website.
13This approach eliminates the problem of length-biased sampling that would apply
to a sample of the stock of ads on the site during an interval of time.
14Since only about 8 percent of applications in our sample result in employer
contacts, we interpret these contacts as a relatively strong interest on the firm’s
part in hiring the worker. Conversations with XMRC officials support this inter-
pretation, as does evidence in all our regressions (detailed below) that the prob-
ability of contact is strongly and positively related to the quality of the match
between workers’ characteristics and the job’s advertised requirements.
15No contacts could mean the firm didn’t hire during our observation period, or they
contacted successful workers using means other than the job board.
16LH in Table 1 and throughout our main analysis denotes Xiamen city hukou
only; workers with Fujian province (but not Xiamen) hukou are treated as NLH
because their legal status in the city is the same as workers from other provinces.
17Unfortunately, 2005 is the most recent Chinese Census data available to us.
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18While we know the location of our applicants’ hukous, our confidentiality agree-
ment with XMRC prevents us from knowing where applicants are located when they
apply to jobs on the website.
19See Kuhn and Shen (2013) and Delgado Helleseter, Kuhn and Shen (2014) for an
analysis of explicit gender targeting in Chinese job ads, which is quite common.
20An average application was competing with about 189 others in our sample. Note
that this is a different concept than the number of applications received by a typical ad,
which we have already noted is about 64.
21We use linear probability models rather than, say, probits, because our most satu-
rated specifications use large numbers of fixed effects (one for each job ad), raising
computational issues as well as concerns with consistency in the presence of a large
number of incidental parameters.
22Only the employer portion of the payroll tax enters equation (1) because the equa-
tion controls for the wage that is paid to the worker. This does not rule out shifting of
the employer tax onto workers via endogenous adjustments in wages. In particular, if
employers pay higher taxes on LH workers and some or all of that tax differential is
shifted onto them, wages for LH workers will be reduced relative to NLH workers. This
would be reflected in a lower value of wij in (1), which has the effect of canceling out
some or all of the effect of LH workers’ higher tax rate on firms’ hiring decisions. We
discuss how the interpretation of our results depends on assumptions about tax shifting
below.
23Survey-based studies of the migrant-native wage gap in China include Meng and
Zhang (2001), Lu (2008) and Xing (2014), all of whom find that migrants earn less than
natives in urban China even after controlling for the usual observable worker character-
istics. Importantly, however, Meng and Zhang, among others, find the gap is substan-
tially reduced when controls for employer type (specifically, public sector and SOE) are
introduced.
24In addition to institutional factors, the amount of pass through may also depend on
how much workers value the public health and retirement benefits their higher taxes
buy (Summers 1989). For example, if LH workers place a high value on these benefits,
employers will find it easier to ask them to accept a lower wage than migrants who are
not entitled to the same benefits. The only effect on our analysis is on the value of,
since employers care only about the relative wages, tax costs, and productivity of two
workers when choosing whom to hire for the job.
25Adjusting wages to shift employer taxes onto workers is illegal in Xiamen, though it
is unclear how strongly this prohibition is enforced.
26Applications that were contacted via methods other than the website (such as tele-
phone) are treated as not being contacted in our data. This could be an issue if firms
tend to use different methods to contact LH versus NLH workers. We explored this
issue in discussions with XMRC officials, who stated that this was highly unlikely. The
marginal financial cost of contacting an applicant anywhere in China is zero both by
telephone and via the site, and recruiters generally find it easiest to issue all callbacks
to the same job in the same way.
27The standard errors in Table 2 adjust for correlation among applications to the
same ad by clustering on ads; this handles a substantial share of the likely error correla-
tions in our data since the typical ad received about 63 applications. To explore the
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effects of within-applicant error correlations on the significance of our estimates
(which are likely much smaller since the average resume applied to only 2.8 jobs), we
replicated our main results on a sample consisting of one randomly-selected applica-
tion from each worker. There was very little change.
28Zhicheng is a nationally-recognized worker certification system that assigns an offi-
cial rank (from one through six) to workers in almost every occupation. While educa-
tion and experience play key roles in many occupations’ zhicheng ranking schemes,
several professions also use government-organized nationwide or province-wide exams
both to qualify for and to maintain one’s zhicheng rank.
29The column 5 coefficient is essentially identical to the column 3 coefficient because
NLH apply to higher-callback occupations (column 4), but to individual ads where
there is more competition for the job (column 5).
30Some search models of discrimination, such as Lang, Manove and Dickens (2005) have
the property that in equilibrium, groups that anticipate encountering discrimination in the
hiring process direct their search towards lower-wage jobs, which may be easier to get.
31Some commentators on this paper have suggested that payroll tax noncompliance
among employers of unskilled NLH workers might help account for those workers’
stronger NLH callback advantage. The very low statutory NLH tax rates in Table 1,
however, imply that even complete noncompliance (zero taxes) among migrants’ em-
ployers would not substantially alter the skill profile of the NLH tax advantage.
32Admittedly, this is a rather weak test since our wage measures come in bins that
are quite wide. This would leave considerable room for negotiation within a pre-
announced wage bin.
33In general, firms will prefer workers who choose higher effort levels, or who will
accept additional work hours, whenever employment contracts are incomplete, i.e. as
long as the pay rate per hour or piece gives workers less than 100% of the surplus they
generate at the margin.
34Consistent with the notion that employers must match applicants’ current wages,
Table 6 also shows that ceteris paribus, workers with high current wages are less likely
to receive employer callbacks.
35Statistics refer to 18–35 year old college graduates currently living in a city and
employed in the private sector. The comparable rate for movers with high school or
lower education is 99 percent.
36A key source of the difficulty is that most unobserved factors that could
affect callback rates should theoretically affect offer rates conditional on callbacks
in the same direction. For example, suppose (as seems likely) that NLH workers’
productivity is harder to predict than natives. In that case, their higher option
value suggests that employers should not only interview more of them, but make
more job offers to them as well (Lazear 1995). The same should apply if NLH
workers are more likely to accept a job offer than LH applicants: both callbacks
and offers should be higher, with no clear prediction for the ratio of offers to
callbacks.
37See Appendix 1: the share is 62 percent.
38House (2012) documents a similar, though more extreme phenomenon in Saudi
Arabia, where 90 percent of private-sector jobs are held by foreigners, while natives ei-
ther work in the public sector or not at all.
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Appendix 1
Table 7 Employment Statistics by Hukou and Current Residence, 2005 Census









(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. All working-age persons
Age
18–25 9% 15% 12% 18%
26–35 21% 33% 27% 42%
36–45 28% 26% 28% 24%
46–55 28% 17% 23% 12%
56–65 13% 8% 10% 3%
Education
Primary (6 years or less) 7% 20% 21% 26%
Junior Middle School (9 years) 31% 44% 25% 40%
High School (12 years) 34% 21% 27% 21%
College or Junior Technical
School (15 years)
16% 8% 13% 7%
University Degree (16 years
or more)
12% 7% 14% 5%
Employment status
Employed 62% 77% 68% 83%
Not employed 38% 23% 32% 17%
Sources of income
Labor market 61% 76% 67% 81%
Public transfers 23% 6% 13% 3%
Capital income 3% 3% 3% 2%
Family members 13% 15% 16% 14%
Social insurance coverage
UI covered 44% 18% 38% 21%
Pension covered 72% 31% 60% 30%
Medical insurance covered 69% 42% 73% 39%
Share of the population 49% 51% 44% 56%
B. Workers only
Weekly working hours (mean) 44.10 49.14 46.49 54.89
1–39 hours 4% 8% 8% 6%
40 hours 66% 35% 47% 21%
41–56 hours 23% 39% 33% 41%
57 hours or more 7% 18% 12% 33%
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Appendix 2
Table 7 Employment Statistics by Hukou and Current Residence, 2005 Census (Continued)
Employer type
Public1 62% 22% 44% 15%
Private2 38% 78% 56% 85%
Nature of work contract
Fixed term 34% 33% 43% 37%
Infinite term 40% 15% 23% 7%
No contract 27% 52% 35% 57%
Duration of contract if fixed term
1 year or below 59% 73% 62% 71%
1-2 years 12% 10% 13% 10%
2-3 years 19% 11% 21% 12%
More than 3 years 9% 6% 5% 6%
Share of the population 43% 57% 39% 61%
Data are from the 2005 Census of China, 1% sample, persons aged 15–65, healthy, current living in urban regions,
excluding students. All rural hukou individuals are regarded as without local hukou in the urban area. Major cities
are the four municipalities directly under the jurisdiction of the central government (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjing
and Chongqing) plus the 15 subprovincial cities: Changchun, Chendgu, Dalian, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Harbin,
Jinan, Nanjing, Ningbo, Qingdao, Shenyang, Shenzhen, Wuhan, Xiamen, and Xi’an. Column 1 (LH) shows
characteristics of all working-age persons who have a permanent residence permit in their current city of
residence. Column (2) (NLH) is for the remainder of urban residents, whose hukou registration is elsewhere; most
but not all of these persons are rural–urban migrants from poorer parts of China. Columns 3 and 4 replicate
columns 1 and 2 for the city of Xiamen only. Here “Public” employer type refers to SOEs, government and
collectives, where collectives play a minimal role in urban areas; “Private” employer type refers to for-profit firms,
self-employed and other
Table 8 Employer and Employee average payroll tax rates for retirement and health insurance,
Xiamen City, 2010
Employer Taxes Only Employer Plus Worker Taxes




























1500 .26 .07 .19 285 .38 .14 .24 360
2000 .21 .05 .16 320 .31 .11 .20 400
2300a .21 .05 .16 368 .31 .09 .22 506
3000 .21 .04 .17 510 .31 .07 .24 720
4000 .21 .03 .18 720 .31 .05 .26 1040
5000 .21 .02 .19 950 .31 .04 .27 1350
Source: Xiamen Local Taxation Bureau 2010
ais the approximate mean wage in XMRC analysis sample. 98 percent of offered and current wages in our data
are between 1000 and 5000 yuan/month. Tax basis: For retirement insurance, tax rates are applied to the worker’s
actual salary for LH workers, but to a fixed amount of 900 yuan per month for NLH workers. For medical
insurance, tax rates are applied to the worker’s actual salary (with a minimum of 1823 yuan/month) for LH
workers, but to a fixed amount of 1823 yuan/month for NLH workers. Both tax bases for LH workers are capped
at three times the city average salary: 9114 yuan/month. Tax rates: For retirement insurance, LH workers and their
employers pay 8% and 14% of the basis respectively. NLH workers and their employers each contribute 8 percent
of their basis respectively. For medical insurance, LH workers and their employers contribute 2% and 7% of the
basis respectively. NLH workers and their employers each contribute 2% of the basis
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